Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.
Introduction
Matching models in economics mostly have a two-sided structure, e.g., workers and firms, buyers and sellers. In this paper we study Pairing Games or Pairing Markets where an arbitrary set of players partition into pairs and singletons. Each pair of players has a continuum of activities to jointly choose from if they form a pair -call it a partnership or a bilateral transaction. We are interested in outcomes that are stable or in competitive equilibrium and in designing a procedure to achieve them.
Our model is a generalization of the assignment game (Shapley and Shubik (1972) ) in two ways.
First, players are not a priori partitioned into two sides. Second, utility realizations permit income effects and are not restricted to the quasilinear, i.e., transferable utility (TU) domain.
The assignment game has been very fruitful in modelling a wide range of economic situations, e.g., markets with indivisibles, marriage, fair allocations, principal-agent matching.
1 An important property of the assignment game is the existence and coincidence of pairwise stable and competitive equilibrium allocations. Also, two sidedness has permitted the design of rather simple coordinated market procedures 2 for attaining desired outcomes, and the results carry over to more general cases.
For example, players' preferences may belong to the general nontransferable utility domain 3 , players on one side may have multiple partners if preferences satisfy gross substitutability 4 , and players on both sides may have multiple partners if preferences are additive separable.
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Yet many markets are not two-sided : For example many mergers occur among firms that are alike. Likewise, acquisitions and joint ventures. 6 Various swap markets are example to the multiple partners version of our model. 7 So are organized markets for bilateral contracting in electricity where some players are seller to one partner and buyer to another. 8 It is only recently on the other hand that Pairing Games and Markets are being explored.
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One reason why non-two-sided models have not been much considered is the possible nonexistence of stable or competitive equilibrium allocations. This possibility is not uncommon. For example, in the three-player game where two players may share a cake and none of the cakes is sufficiently large in comparison to the other two cakes, the odd-man-out will be able to lure away one of the partners in any pair that forms. So there is no stable allocation or equilibrium in partnership prices.
In this paper we offer a comprehensive analysis for pairing games. We use elementary tools from graph theory and and a representation theorem that we obtain here. We address Existence of Solutions, Structural Properties, Bargaining Aspects, and Procedure Design. The reason for including all in one paper is the common underlying mathematics.
One of our interests is to address what may happen when stable allocations do not exist. To this end, we first consider half-partnerships and allow a player to have two half-partners as an alternative to having one full partner. We call an allocation with no blocking pair stable if only full-partnerships can form and semistable if both full-partnerships and half-partnerships can form. We then show that there is an Equilibrium Set always nonempty (Theorem 1) and that this set is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations (Theorem 2.) Stable and semistable allocations are competitive equilibrium allocations when players' utilities are interpreted as partnership prices.
The structural properties of the Equilibrium Set do not depend on whether it consists of stable or semistable allocations. The reason for this is that the variable part of the Equilibrium Set is always associated with full-partnerships (Proposition 2.) Then, on the TU domain, the players under fullpartnership endogenously partition into two sides (Proposition 3) ; hence, the Equilibrium Set of a pairing game is essentially identical to the Equilibrium Set of an assignment game, in particular, it has a lattice structure and admits a median allocation. This may be somewhat surprising but, not surprisingly, is not true on the NTU domain. We also show that the Equilibrium Set has a median property and is a virtually convex set (Propositions 4 and 5.)
Then we consider what would happen if stable allocations do not exist and half-partnerships are not viable. Specifically we look at Bargaining Set allocations where no player joins a blocking pair if she sees disadvantageous counterblocking. Interestingly the Equilibrium Set enters the scene again. We show that each payoff vector in the Equilibrium Set generates a set of maximumstable allocations (Proposition 6) and a particular subset of these -which we call pseudostable -is contained in the Demand Bargaining Set 10 (Theorem 3.) While they pertain to different institutional environments, semistable and pseudostable allocations are closely related. To illustrate, in the threeplayer game, the allocation where each player is half-partner to the other two players and the cakes are shared "equally" is semistable. And each of the three allocations where two players share the cake "equally" and the third player gets nothing is pseudostable.
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Another important part of our work is the Market Procedure for reaching the Equilibrium Set.
It is a non-two-sided and NTU generalization of the Demange Gale Sotomayor (1986) auction. The NTU aspect is based on the key lemma behind Theorem 1. The non-two-sidedness aspect utilizes -10 Introduced for TU games by Morelli and Montero (2003) as a refinement of the Zhou Bargaining Set (Zhou one of our main results in the paper -the representation theorem (Theorem 5) already mentioned.
We present the Market Procedure at two levels. We first show that it reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps (Theorem 4.) Then we spell out (in Appendix D) how the computations can be done recursively at each step. Thus the dynamics are specified at a basic level and respect computational efficacy.
In addition to our main results summarized above, we show that stable allocations exist when there are an even number of players in each type (Proposition 1). This result generalizes to the NTU domain the main result of Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie (2012) . We also give a characterization of the Demand Bargaining Set for pairing games (Proposition 7.)
The organization of the paper is as follows : In the first subsection below, we review the existing literature on pairing games and point out our contributions ; in the second subsection, we give an analytical overview and describe Theorem 5. Section 2 gives our model and basic definitions.
Sections 3 to 6 contain the results mentioned above. Appendix A presents the mathematical tools we use and Theorem 5. Appendix B contains proofs for Sections 3 and 4. Appendix C is an addendum to Section 5 and Appendix D to Section 6.
Current Literature and Summary of Contributions
The existing literature on pairing games or markets consists of a small number of papers and they are all on the TU domain. The earliest one is by Eriksson and Karlander (2001) ; they give a characterization for stable allocations -at a given matching -that is similar to the characterization for roommate problems by Tan (1991) and then use linear programming duality for optimal matchings. Talman and Yang (2011) also give a characterization that uses linear programming duality. Sotomayor (2005) has a characterization that is based on "simple outcomes" and is self-contained but of a nonconstructive nature. Our Theorems 1 and 2 generalize these results by offering a complementary solution concept -semistable allocations -for when stable allocations do not exist and by covering the NTU domain. Our approach is self-contained and constructive.
Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie (2012), as already mentioned, consider games with player types and show that stable allocations exist for populations with an even number of players in each type.
We infer this result for the NTU domain from our Theorems 1 and 2.
More recently, have given an algorithm that finds a stable allocation via satisfying blocking pairs, but not in a genuine sense, as it makes use of a preconceived target stable allocation, and Andersson et al (2013) a market procedure that finds a stable allocationvia equal-surplus-division allocations at overdemanded sets -without, however, addressing bounded convergence.
4
Our Market Procedure is a genuine procedure that converges in a (polynomially) bounded number of steps and is on the NTU domain (Theorem 4.) It has moreover a recursive basic-level specification through the Algorithm we describe in Appendix D.
Our results on the properties of the Equilibrium Set (Propositions 2 to 6) are entirely new.
So is the Bargaining Set analysis we offer, in particular, our result (Theorem 3) on the stability of pseudostable allocations -a solution concept introduced here -and the characterization of the Demand Bargaining Set for pairing games (Proposition 7.)
As one of the major contributions of our paper, lastly, we mention our "demand analysis" and the representation theorem (Theorem 5) in the Mathematical Section in Appendix A. These we describe in the subsection below.
The Analytical Aspect
We make no interpersonal comparison of utility : We work with aspirations that are payoff vectors which assign a maximum-utility to each player that she can achieve given the maximum-utilities of other players. 12 These utilities can be seen as prices that players ask for entering into partnership.
At an aspiration, a player may find herself indifferent among a number of players for forming a partnership, thus have a non-singleton demand set. We typically deal with aspirations where many players have non-singleton demands sets.
At an aspiration, we look for demand-compatible matchings that leave a minimum number of active players unmatched -"active" meaning "above reservation utility". We call these matchings active-minimum.
Aspirations are of two types : At any aspiration, either there is a subset of players that partition into two sides, with an excess of (say) "buyers" over "sellers", in which case we say there is a
seller-market -a definition we introduce here 13 -or there is no such subset of players. We call an aspiration of the latter type balanced. If it is possible to match all active players at a balanced aspiration then that aspiration is a stable allocation. Otherwise it is a semistable allocation. The Equilibrium Set is the set of all balanced aspirations. 
Model and Basic Definitions
A pairing game is a triplet (N, r, f ) where N is a finite set of players, the vector r = (r i ) gives the stand alone utilities of players, and the array f = (f ij ) consists of partnership functions for pairs of players : f ij (u j ) is the utility u i which i achieves as partner of j when j achieves the utility u j . In particular
We assume f ij are continuous decreasing functions and f ij (r j ) < ∞. In the special class of TU or quasilinear games, u i = f ij (u j ) = c ij − u j and c ij = c ji .
14 Active-minimum matchings are essentially maximum-cardinality matchings and our work is closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem (1963 ,1964 ,1965 although we nowhere use it explicitly. This Theorem says that, in any graph, players partition into three types -let us say, "independent", "central", "substitutable" -such that (i) every maximum-cardinality matching pairs an independent player with an independent player, a central player with a substitutable player, and leaves unmatched only a subset of the substitutable players, and that (ii) each unmatched player resides in an odd-cycle defined with respect to the matching. An odd-cycle may be a singleton.
(In the Gallai Edmonds Theorem there is no distinction of active vs nonactive players : A solitary player is an active singleton player.) We do not know whether singleton-minimum matchings have been utilized. 
Stable Allocations
A payoff is a vector u ∈ R N that assigns a utility to each player. A pair ij is said to block a payoff
A payoff is stable if it cannot be blocked by any pair. We throughout restrict attention to individually rational payoffs u ≥ r.
A matching is a set of pairs where each player is in at most one pair. Given a matching µ, a payoff u ≥ r is realizable by µ if
and u i = r i for i unmatched. An allocation is a payoff that is realizable by some matching. We also give an allocation u in the form (u, µ) when u is realizable by µ. A stable allocation is a stable payoff that is an allocation.
An aspiration is a stable payoff u that is individually feasible in the sense that u i = r i or u i = f ij (u j ) for some j for every i. An aspiration is equivalently a payoff u where u i is
namely, the maximum-utility that player i can achieve, through some partnership or by standing alone, given all the other maximum-utilities.
equilibrium allocation is a list of prices or an aspiration that is realizable. Thus stable allocation, competitive equilibrium allocation and realizable aspiration are equivalent.
We let r = 0 with no loss of generality and regard (N, f ) as describing a pairing game or market fixed in the rest of the paper.
Demand at Aspirations and Seller-Markets
Let u be an aspiration. Define D i (u) = {j|u i = f ij (u j )}. We say i demands j ∈ D i (u) and call
The set of all pairs ij who demand each other, D(u), is the demand
A matching
is said to be demand-compatible or a matching at u. A player set S ⊂ N is matchable into T ⊂ N if there is a demand-compatible matching µ such that, for every i ∈ S, there is a pair ij ∈ µ with
A player i is active if u i > 0 and nonactive if u i = 0. Note that u is realizable -hence, a stable allocation -if and only if the set of all active players is matchable into N .
We call a pair of player sets (B, S) a submarket at u if (i) B consists of active players,
(ii) the demand set of every B-player is in S, and (iii) S is matchable into B.
By (iii), the excess |B| − |S| is nonnegative.
Our interest is in bipartite submarkets (B, S) where B ∩ S is empty. 16 We refer to B-players and S-players as buyers and sellers respectively.
Definition 1 A seller-market at u is a bipartite submarket with positive excess and a balancedmarket is a bipartite submarket with zero excess.
If there is a seller-market at u, we say that u has a seller-market or that u is an aspiration with a seller-market. It is clear that if u has a seller-market then u is not a stable allocation. As we will show, on the other hand, a seller-market at u points the way to an aspiration with no seller-market.
Let us consider the three-player games to illustrate our basic definitions :
16 Note that a bipartite submarket is not exactly a "two-sided buyers-and-sellers" market because a seller may demand a seller.
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Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the TU games where f ij (u j ) = c ij − u j and say c ij = 1 for every i, j. Take any aspiration u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ). There are two cases. Case 1: u i = 1/2 for every i.
Then D i (u) = N −i for every i and there is no submarket, in particular, N is not matchable into N .
Case 2: wlog u 1 = min {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 } and
and u has the seller-market (B = {2, 3} , S = {1}). No stable allocation exists.
In general wlog c 12 = 1, c 13 ≤ 1, c 23 ≤ 1. It is straightforward to show that, when player 3 is "small" in the sense that c 13 + c 23 ≤ 1, there are aspirations where player 3 is nonactive and any such aspiration is a stable allocation. When c 13 +c 23 > 1, on the other hand, (Case 1)
for every i at the aspiration u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) = 1/2(1 + c 13 − c 23 , 1 − c 13 + c 23 , −1 + c 13 + c 23 ), (Case 2) every aspiration u = u has a seller market, therefore no stable allocation exists. The same goes for NTU three-player games as well.
An Extension : Half-Partnerships and Semistable Allocations
Stable or competitive equilibrium allocations do not necessarily exist as in Example 1. Here we give an extension of our model where they exist and are equivalent.
The extension is in the notion of an allocation or realizability : We allow a player to have two half-partners as an alternative to one full-partner, understanding that half-partnership is reciprocal, namely, a player i is half-partner to j if and only if j is half-partner to i. We actually assume that a pair of players i, j can achieve the "half-partnership utilities"
the "half-partnership functions" h ij that satisfy -returns-to-scale) and that the utility of a player with two half-partners is the sum of her half-partnership utilities (separability.) Under these assumptions, when |D i (u)| ≥ 2, a player i is indifferent between any player in D i (u) as a full-partner and any two players in D i (u) as half-partners.
We will show that if there is no stable allocation then there is a "stable" allocation where every player has one full-partner, two half-partners or no partner. In three-player games for instance, when there is no stable allocation, there is an aspiration where D i (u) = N − i for each player i, and each player fulfils her demand by having the other two players as half-partners.
Formally, a half-matching χ is a set of pairs where each player in χ belongs to two pairs, in other words, has two distinct half-partners. Let us note that any half-matching is a disjoint union of cycles where each half-partnerhip in a cycle shares one player with each of its two neighbors in the cycle. A semi-matching is a pair (µ, χ) where µ is a matching, χ is a nonempty half-matching and µ, χ have no player in common.
A payoff u ≥ r is realizable by a semi-matching (µ, χ) if there is an array (v ij ) of half-partnership utilities such that
and u i = 0 otherwise. An allocation now is a payoff u that is realizable by a matching or by a semi-matching.
Definition 2 We call a stable payoff semistable if it is realizable by a semi-matching but not realizable by a matching.
Let us note that a semistable allocation u is a competitive equilibrium allocation where u i is the price of player i for full-partnership and u i /2 for half-partnership.
Remark 2 By our definition, a matching is not a semi-matching and a stable allocation not a semistable allocation. On the other hand, a payoff may be realizable both by a matching and by a semi-matching : For example, in a four-player game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and an aspiration u
is realizable by the half-matching {12, 23, 34, 41}
-a cycle of even cardinality, namely, an even-cycle -as well as by the matching {12, 34}. In general, if u is an aspiration that is realizable by a semi-matching (µ, χ) and η is any even-cycle in χ, then there is a demand-compatible matching ν that covers the η-players, so that u is realizable by the semi-matching (µ ∪ ν, χ − η). In particular, a semistable allocation is always realizable by a semimatching that contains odd-cycles only. In Section 4, we make use of "essential" semi-matchings that contain a minimum number of odd-cycles.
3 Existence of Stable and Semistable Allocations : The
Equilibrium Set
We call an aspiration that has no seller-market a balanced aspiration. Our first theorem says that there always exists a balanced aspiration. Let U be the set of all balanced aspirations.
Theorem 1 U is nonempty.
The proof of this result is of a constructive nature, based on the Direction Lemma which says that, an aspiration with a bipartite submarket (B, S) can be altered to an aspiration with higher S-utilities and lower B-utilities at which (B, S) is still a bipartite submarket.
We state here a key lemma that is the analog of the Decomposition Lemma in the two-sided matching literature. For any two aspirations u, u , consider the disjoint player sets
Our second main result says that a balanced aspiration is a stable allocation or a semistable allocation. More precisely :
Theorem 2 U is the set of all stable allocations or the set of all semistable allocations.
We call a matching at an aspiration active-minimum if the number of active players it leaves unmatched is minimum among all matchings at that aspiration. The underlying fact behind Theorem 2 is that, at any balanced aspiration, there is an active-minimum matching with the following odd-cycle property : every active unmatched player i belongs to a distinct cycle -with at least three players -in which every player demands her two neighbors and every player other than i is matched to a neighbor. So any balanced aspiration that is not realizable by a matching is realizable by a semi-matching. The proof then follows from the fact (based on Lemma 1) that if a balanced aspiration is not realizable by a matching then no balanced aspiration is.
Let us recall that aspiration utilities can be seen as prices and stable or semistable allocations as competitive equilibrium allocations. We call U the Equilibrium Set. In the next section we consider the structural properties of U . Below we give a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation.
Players i and i are of the same type if
for all j other than i, i .
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Proposition 1 U is the set of all stable allocations if there are an even number of players in each type.
Our demonstration is based on the fact that, when there are an even number of players in each type, a balanced aspiration cannot admit any odd-cycle of half-partnerships, therefore, cannot be a semistable allocation.
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Remark 3 It is easily seen that, if there is an even number of players in each type, then there is a stable allocation where same-type players have same-utility. This is not true at every stable allocation, though, as is evident upon considering a two-player game. If there is an even number but more than two players in each type, however, it is easily shown that same-type players have same-utility at every stable allocation.
Structural Properties of the Equilibrium Set
In this section we look at situations where the Equilibrium Set U is not a singleton and consider its structural properties. As pointed out in Example 1, U is a singleton for three-player games that admit a semistable allocation, and as another example, U is a singleton for four-player games that admit a stable allocation where each player demands each of the other players. In general though U is not a singleton. Our first result below shows that the structural properties of U do not depend on whether U consists of stable or semistable allocations.
The Variable Set and Stable Bipartitions : TU vs NTU
Given a half-matching χ, let o(χ) be the number of cycles in χ. Let u be a semistable allocation
Let us call a player in X = {i ∈ N |u i = u i for all u, u ∈ U } a constant player and a player in
We show below that any player who has a half-partner at some essential semistable allocation is necessarily a constant player, more generally, that a nonconstant player is always full-partner with a nonconstant player.
For any matching µ and player set S, let µ(S) = {j|ij ∈ µ, i ∈ S}.
Proposition 2 µ(Y ) = Y at every stable allocation (u, µ) and µ(Y ) = Y at every essential semistable allocation (u, µ, χ).
18 Proposition 1 can be gotten in two other ways : One involves the fact that the stable allocations of a two-fold pairing market coincide with the stable allocations of the two-sided market which has one copy of each type. The other way is to set up a similar equivalence in our extended model with half-partnerships. we ask whether Y partitions into two sides anywhere in V :
Let us call
for every matching µ by which v is realized, and that
Our finding is that, while a stable bipartition exists in general at every v ∈ V (see Lemma 11), a stable partition over V exists for TU but not necessarily for NTU games.
There is a stable bipartition over V .
This result says that, on the TU domain, V has essentially the same properties as the Equilibrium Set of a TU assignment game. In particular, with respect to a stable partition (Y 1 , Y 2 ) of the nonconstant player set Y , 21 V has a lattice structure and a Y 1 -optimal allocation that is Y 2 -pessimal.
Moreover, with reference to Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) , we can conclude that V -therefore Uhas a unique median allocation.
Below is a heterogenously linear game where there is no stable bipartition over V = U .
Example 2 There are six players in N = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. The partnership functions are
where the pair (c ij , q ij ) is equal to (15, 2) for ij ∈ {12, 23, 31} and (15/2, 1/2) for ij ∈ {21, 32, 13}
19 Recall the players labelled independent in the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem (Footnote 14.) Every nonconstant player is an independent player except possibly at u on the boundary of U . 20 It is worthwhile to add the following observation : Consider the game restricted to constant players, i.e., (X, f ).
It is easily seen that the Equilibrium Set of (X, f ) is identical to U X = {u X |u ∈ U }. The Equilibrium Set of (Y, f ) on the other hand is in general a superset of U Y = V . For example, when N = {1,2,3} and the worth of a pair is 3 for {1,2} and 1 otherwise, U = {x, 3 − x, 0} where 1 ≤ x ≤ 2. Y = {1,2} and the Equilibrium set of (Y, f ) is
21 It is clear that there is a unique stable bipartition over V unless V is a "product" : In general, let
Then there is a unique stable bipartition over each V k .
(30, 10) for ij ∈ {46,65,54} and (3, 1/10) for ij ∈ {64, 56, 45}
(10, 1) for ij ∈ {14, 41, 25, 52, 36, 63}
and (0, 0) otherwise. It is straightforward to check that the demand graphs at the three allocations u = [7, 9, 3, 3, 2, 10], u = [3, 7, 9, 10, 3, 2] , u = [9, 3, 7, 2, 10, 3] are
respectively (see Figure 2 ) and that each allocation is realizable by a unique matching. It is easily seen that N has no partition to two sides such that each of these matchings matches one side to the other. be the mth payoff in K i , namely, the median of K i for |K| odd and the lower median of K i for |K| even. Let u * * i = u * i for |K| odd and u * * i be the m + 1st payoff or upper median of K i for |K| even. We define
and say that U has the median property if, for every finite collection K = u k with u k ∈ U , there is a u ∈ U with u i ∈ med {K i } for every i.
Proposition 4 U has the median property.
Proposition 4 is a generalization to pairing games of the median property Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) have shown for TU assignment games and of the median property Eriksson and Karlander (2001) have shown for TU pairing games when |K| = 3.
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Clearly U is a closed bounded set. Our next result says that U is akin to a convex set. Say that a vector z is between two vectors z, z if
Proposition 5 U is a virtually convex set.
It can be shown that a virtually convex set is equivalently a set Z such that (i) any pair z, z in Z can be connected by a continuous "monotone" path in Z or (ii) any z not in Z can be separated from Z by an orthant. See Alkan and Gale (1990) . It is a straightforward conclusion that U is a convex polyhedral set when the partnership functions f ij are linear.
Pseudostable Allocations
In this section we consider what may happen in a pairing game when no stable allocation exists and half-partnerships are not viable.
This question has been taken up in the context of the roommate problem by Tan (1990) 
Maximum-Stable Allocations and Balanced-Aspiration-Allocations
For any payoff z and T ⊂ N , let z T = (z i ) i∈T . For any allocation (v, µ) and T ⊇ µ(N ), consider the "restricted" game (T, f ) and note that (v T , µ) is an allocation for (T, f ); in particular
We say that an allocation (v, µ) is restricted-stable if there is a player set T ⊇ µ(N ) such that
is stable in (T, f ) and call the players in N − T * the outcasts of (v, µ).
Definition 3 A maximum-stable allocation is a restricted-stable allocation with a minimum number of outcasts.
For any payoff z and matching µ, we denote z µ the payoff where
Definition 4 An aspiration-allocation is an allocation (v, µ) such that v = u µ for an aspiration u.
A straighforward observation, which we state without proof, is that an allocation is restrictedstable if and only if it is an aspiration-allocation. We call an aspiration-allocation u µ balanced if u is balanced and maximum if µ is active-minimum.
Proposition 6 Every maximum balanced-aspiration-allocation is maximum-stable.
Remark 4 When no stable allocation exists, there exist -a plethora of -maximum-stable allocations that are not balanced-aspiration-allocations : This may be seen by considering any aspiration u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) in a three-player game where each player is active and demand is {12, 13}. Clearly
is a maximum-stable allocation and u is not balanced. This shows that maximum-stability may have less appeal as a solution concept for pairing games than for roommate problems.
Pseudostable Allocations and Bargaining Set Stability
Recall that a three-player pairing game with no stable allocation has a unique balanced aspiration u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) and so -the null allocation (0, 0, 0) aside -the balanced-aspiration-allocations
Binmore (1985) showed that (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) is the only mutually consistent endogenous outside-option vector -when any two players may bargain and the outside player is a potential partner in case they cannot agree -and argued that the three allocations above is the "stable set" of the game.
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Another argument to support this view is the following two-step farsighted stability or Bargaining Set argument : Each of the three allocations would survive -because a prudent player would not be lured into forming a blocking pair with the odd-man-out since he could in turn become the odd-man-out -and every other allocation would be blocked even under prudence.
Here we consider whether there is a natural generalization of the "stable set" above to pairing games with any number of players. We give a partial answer. We show that there is a particular subset of maximum balanced-aspiration-allocations -that we call pseudostable -which is always in an "exclusive" Bargaining Set of the game.
Let us recall that, at any balanced aspiration, there is a particular active-minimum matching with the following odd-cycle property : Each active unmatched player i belongs to a distinct cycle -with at least three players -in which every player demands her two neighbors and every player other than i is matched to a neighbor ; namely, no active unmatched player is "solitary". We call such a matching solitary-null.
Definition 5 We call a balanced-aspiration-allocation u µ pseudostable if µ is solitary-null.
Remark 5 Let u be any balanced aspiration. Recall that the set of maximum-stable allocations generated by u is BAA(u) = {u µ |µ active-minimum at u}. The set of pseudostable allocations generated by u is
Not surprisingly, pseudostable and semistable allocations are closely related : Let (u, µ, χ) be any essential semistable allocation at u and H ⊂ N be the players in the half-matching χ. As previously noted, H partitions into k odd-cycles C i each associated with an active unmatched player i. In fact, µ is a solitary-null matching at u iff
where µ i is a matching in C i that leaves any one player in C i unmatched. So there is a solitary-null matching µ at u for every selection of k players from C 1 × ... × C k . Associated with each essential semistable allocation (u, µ, χ) then, we obtain a set of |C 1 | × ... × |C k | solitary-null matchings or pseudostable allocations. P SA(u) is their union over all the essential semistable allocations at u. 24 Binmore also showed that each allocation in the "stable set" is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential bargaining game. Bennett (1997) has shown for a general class of cooperative games that there always exist "consistent endogenous outside-options", that they are aspirations, and that a large set of aspirations turn out as the SPE outcomes of sequential bargaining games.
Having defined pseudostable allocations, let us define a Bargaining Set. There are several definitions and variants. We employ the Demand Bargaining Set proposed by Morelli and Montero (2003) which is a refinement of the well-known Bargaining Set proposed by Zhou (1994) ). The latter has the following definition :
Let υ be an allocation. An objection against υ is a pair (T, υ ) where T ⊂ N and υ is an allocation for the restricted game (T, f ) such that
A counterobjection to (T, υ ) is a pair (Q, υ ) where Q ⊂ N and υ is an allocation for the restricted game (Q, f ) such that
An objection against υ is justified if there is no counterobjection to it. An allocation is in the Zhou Bargaining Set Z if there is no justified objection against it.
It is well known that a Bargaining Set -Z included -is typically "large" and not sufficiently exclusive in describing bargaining outcomes. Our main reason in employing the Demand Bargaining Set D is that D is more exclusive than Z. We give the definition of D by stating the differences it has with the definition of Z. 25 There are four differences :
(iv) Q − T or T − Q may be empty.
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Remark 6 There will in general be many allocations that belong to Z but not to D. This is because D admits aspiration-allocations only and because -primarily by condition (ii) -counterobjection in D is highly restricted than in Z.
In Appendix C we give a characterization for the Demand Bargaining Set from which follows our main result :
25 The definition of D in Morelli and Montero (2003) is for TU games. Theorem 3 Pseudostable allocations are in the Demand Bargaining Set.
Theorem 3 says that pseudostable allocations are "stable" from an "exclusive" Bargaining Set perspective. By the same perspective, on the other hand, there may be other "stable" allocations.
Examples in Appendix C show that these may in fact be various not fitting into a classification at hand. The Demand Bargaining Set may actually contain a non-balanced aspiration-allocation even when there is a competitive equilibrium at some other aspiration. 28 In the next section, we give a coordinated Market Procedure that always arrives at a balanced aspiration.
Market Procedure
Here we give a Procedure for finding a balanced aspiration. For simplicity, we restrict our presentation to heterogenously linear partnership functions that have the form
Procedure starts from any aspiration, generates a piecewise linear path of aspirations, and stops in a bounded number of steps at a balanced aspiration.
Here is a preview : The Procedure is coordinated by a Center that displays an aspiration at each The Center can actually choose any seller-market. In the Procedure we present here, it is the "grand" Seller-Market -the union of all "unitary" seller-markets -that is chosen at each aspiration.
The Center is able to identify the Seller-Market continuously by a simple recursive algorithm that we spell out in the subsection below. This is based on the characterization of Seller-Markets via "solitary-minimum" matchings that we give in Theorem 5 in Appendix A.
There is a single criterion for admitting a direction d at any aspiration u on the path, namely the requirement that the Seller-Market at u+λd be identical to the Seller-Market at u for all sufficiently small λ > 0. When the Seller-Market changes at an aspiration and d is no longer "Seller-MarketPreserving" (definition below), the Center needs to find a new Seller-Market-Preserving direction.
On the quasilinear domain, the direction that has the entry +1 for every Seller, −1 for every Buyer and 0 for all other players ensures this. On the heterogeneously linear domain, the Center determines 28 This may be compared with Klijn and Masso (2003) who show that the core in the discrete two-sided case is essentially equivalent to the Zhou Bargaining Set. 29 The extension to games with piecewise linear partnership functions can be carried by adaptation from Alkan (1992,1997).
differential rates by interacting with the Sellers and Buyers about their "marginal" demand sets.
This is described in the Direction Procedure below.
To conclude the preview, there is actually one other situation where the Center has to reset the direction. This occurs when the path arrives at an aspiration where the Seller-Market has not changed but would change for any continuation along the current direction. Such a situation may arise only when a new demand is registered by a Buyer Seller pair. This does not occur on the quasilinear domain.
Formally, let u be an aspiration and d be a feasible direction (namely, a vector in R N such that u + λd is an aspiration for λ > 0 sufficiently small.) By linearity of the partnership functions, the demand graph
is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0. We denote this graph
and call it the outgoing directional demand graph at u in the direction d. We will say that d is
Similarly D(u − λd) = {ij|j ∈ D i (u − λd)} is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we
and call the incoming directional demand graph. Likewise the set of active players A(u − λd) is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we denote
Clearly, demand changes at u if and only if
It is important to note this may happen finitely often and when it does
Step 0 : Take any aspiration u = u 0 .
Step 
Let us suppress reference to u t and write
Seller-Market at u t . The Procedure below utilizes the information
The Direction Procedure
Step 0 : Set the initial direction to be the vector e 0 where e 0 i is equal to 1 if i ∈ S * , min j D i {q ij } if i ∈ B * , and 0 otherwise.
Then alter the direction e k (δ) by increasing δ continuously above 0 to δ * where a new
The Direction Procedure 30 finds a Seller-Market preserving direction at u t : This can be seen in the proof of Lemma 7 in Appendix B.
30 Has been adapted from Alkan (1992 Alkan ( ,1997 where it is given for arbitrary piecewise linear partnership functions.
On the present domain, it is a "multiplicative" analog of the well-known DGS auction (1986) and has identical convergence properties.
Theorem 4 The Market Procedure reaches a balanced aspiration in a bounded number of steps.
It is immediate from the stopping rule that the Market Procedure ends at a balanced aspiration.
We state below the main reason why it converges in a bounded 31 number of steps : Three attributes of the Seller-Market -the excess in the Seller-Market, the number of Sellers, the Seller-Market itself -are lexicographically monotone along the Procedure Path.
Lemma 2 Let (u t ) be any sequence of aspirations generated by the Market Procedure, (B t , S t ) be the Seller-Market at u t and a t = |B t | − |S t | , b t = |S t |. Then, for all t,
and if a t+1 = a t then
We prove Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 in Appendix D.
Remark 7 The Market Procedure is based on identifying the Seller-Market at aspirations on the
Procedure Path where demand changes. It would be computationally demanding if this had to done from scratch each time. This is not the case. In Appendix D, we give a simple Algorithm that generates successive solitary-minimum matchings and solitary-player sets -recursively -at aspirations where demand changes. By Theorem 5, then, the Seller-Market is identifiable recursively. In result, the Algorithm and the Direction Procedure together specify a "dynamic" Market Procedure that is computationally efficacious.
Concluding Remarks
We have given a comprehensive analysis for pairing games or markets which are the non-two-sided and NTU generalization of assignment games. The complexity that these two aspects bring remain separate : In fact the Direction Lemma (Appendix B) captures nearly all that is essential in our 31 It can be shown by an argument similar to the one given in Alkan (1992 Alkan ( ,1997 ) that, in fact, the number of steps is polynomially bounded.
treatment of the NTU aspect 32 and a substantial part of our work would have to be carried in nearly the same way if we had stayed on the TU domain -e.g, our characterization of the Seller-Market and its identification on the Procedure Path or our Bargaining Set analysis. Also, there are significant differences between what results hold on the TU vs NTU domains but these are not so surprising.
The sharpest difference we have pointed out is the fact that the Equilibrium Set does not have the stable bipartition property on the NTU domain that it has on the TU domain.
We have looked at pairing games from both a coalitional game and a market equilibrium perspective. In our context essential blocking coalitions are pairs. Relatedly, stable and competitive equilibrium allocations coincide when they exist. In fact, in our first solution concept extension -half-partnerships and semistable allocations -stable and competitive equilibrium allocations do coincide.
In the second extension -Bargaining Set stability and pseudostable allocations -coalitions of all sizes may be essential, coincidence breaks down and "market forces" may be ineffective. The Finally a remark about a limiting case of our model : The partnership functions in our model do not allow "flats" that arise under budget constraints for example. The broader model that allows for flats can be uniformly approximated by our model and existence results would carry over. On the other hand, some of our results on the properties of the Equilibrium Set do not and designing a Market procedure appears more involved.
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32 We have adapted the Direction Lemma from our earlier work on the NTU assignment game where it has sometimes been referred to as the Perturbation Lemma : Alkan (1989 Alkan ( ,1992 Alkan ( ,1997 ,, Alkan and Gale (1990) , Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991) . There are only a few other papers on the NTU assignment game : Moldovanu (1990) , Kucuksenel (2011) . 33 Bennett (1983 Bennett ( ,1997 and Bennett and Zame (1988) have elaborated on the market aspect of aspirations in their work on general coalitional games. 34 Alkan, Anbarci and Sarpça (2012) is an exercise in this domain.
A Mathematical Section
Let (N, f ) be a pairing game and u be any aspiration. In this section we use elementary notions from graph theory to make some observations about the demand graph D(u). The main tool is a "maximum-cardinality" matching that we call active-minimum. Our main objective is to define a unique Seller-Market at u and to identify it via certain active-minimum matchings.
A.1 Definition : the Seller-Market is the Union of all Unitary Markets
Definition 6 A unitary market at u is a seller-market (B, S) where |B| − |S| = 1 and S is matchable into B − i for every i ∈ B. The importance of unitary markets is that union of unitary markets is a seller-market. We omit the straightforward proof. We call the union of all unitary markets the Seller-Market at u.
It is in general not

A.2 Active-Minimum Matchings and µ i −Markets
Let µ be a matching at u. A player i is active-unmatched if i is active at u and not matched by µ.
Let A(µ) be the set of active-unmatched players at µ.
Let i ∈ A(µ). The following are standard definitions : We say j is µ-reachable from i if there is a sequence of distinct players
, and
for every k ≤ n − 1. Let i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n−1 ; j 1 , ..., j n be such a sequence from i = i 0 . If j n is unmatched, then µ can be augmented to the matching that contains the pairs i k−1 j k -instead of the pairs i k j k -and matches at least one more active player. If j n is matched with a nonactive player, then µ can be alternated to the matching that contains the pairs i k−1 j k -instead of the pairs i k j k and j n µ(j n ) -and matches one more active player.
Definition 7 A matching µ is active-minimum if |A(µ)| ≤ |A(µ )| for every matching µ at u. 35 ,
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Let µ be active-minimum and i ∈ A(µ).
We refer to the sequence i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n -where i 0 = i, j n = j, i k−1 j k ∈ D(u), i k j k ∈ µ -as a µ-sequence from i ; we say it is cyclic or a µ i −cycle if
and call it cycle-free if there is no player i m such that
We say player i is µ−cyclic if there is a µ i −cycle.
(c) not cycle-free Note that, in a µ i -market (I, J), I consists of active players for otherwise µ could be alternated to match an additional active player. Also, by "reachability", the demand sets of I-players are in J and µ(J) ⊂ I. Thus a µ i -market is a submarket at u. It need not be bipartite.
Example 3 Suppose there are three players all active at u and D(u) = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}. Consider the matching µ = {2, 3}. The µ-sequence 1, 2; 3 reaches 3 from 1. The µ 1 -market is (I, J) =
The following is a straightforward observation.
Lemma 3 A µ i -market is bipartite if and only if every µ-sequence from i is cycle-free.
Proof. The "only if" part is clear from Example 3. For the "if" part, note that since µ is activeminimum, the demand set of every I-player is in J, so it remains to show I ∩ J = ∅. Suppose not :
Then there are two µ-sequences i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n and i 0 , i 1 , ..., i m ; j 1 , ..., j m from i 0 = i 0 = i and a smallest index k such that (say)
for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m . Then k = 1 for otherwise the µ-sequence i 0 , i 1 , ..., i k ; j 1 , ..., j k is cyclic. For k ≥ 2, the µ-sequence i 0 , i 1 , .., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n where i 0 , i 1 , .., i k = i 0 , i 1 , .., i k and
., i n = j k−1 , ..., j 1 and j k +1 , ..., j n = i k−1 , .., i 1 is cyclic because
Remark 8 A bipartite µ i -market (I, J) is a unitary market : To see this, note first that (I, J) is a seller market with unit excess, and that, for any i ∈ I − i, since µ(i ) is µ-reachable from i, µ can be alternated to a matching that matches J to I − i .
Below we introduce a class of active-minimum matchings µ for which µ-markets from solitary players are bipartite.
A.3 Solitary-Minimum Matchings and Solitary-Player Markets
Let µ be an active-minimum matching. We distinguish between the players in A(µ) according to whether they are µ-cyclic : We call a µ-cyclic player nonsolitary and a non-µ-cyclic player solitary.
Lemma 4 Let µ, µ be any two active-minimum matchings at u. A player who is nonsolitary (solitary) at µ is either matched or nonsolitary (solitary) at µ .
Proof.
If a player i is nonsolitary at µ, then there is a µ-cycle i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n from i 0 = i.
Let ν be an active-minimum matching where i n is unmatched. Suppose i is unmatched at µ and consider the µ -sequence C = i 0 , i 1 , ..., i m ; j 1 , ..., j m from i 0 = i with j k = υ(i k−1 ) and maximum length m. If i m is matched in ν, say ν(i m ) = j, then either µ is not active-minimum (when j is unmatched in µ ) or m is not maximum length. Therefore, i m must be unmatched in ν and then i m = i n (otherwise i m is ν-reachable from i n and so ν is not active-minimum). Hence, C is cyclic and so i is nonsolitary at µ .
We now give our main definition : Let Z(µ) denote the set of all solitary players at µ. Proof. Suppose to the contrary that i is a solitary player at µ and the µ i -market is not bipartite.
By Lemma 3, there is a µ-sequence i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n from i 0 = i such that
for some player i m = i 0 . Alternate µ to µ which matches i 0 but not i n . Now i n is nonsolitary at µ . This is because the µ -sequence i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n−m ; j 1 , ..., j n−m from i 0 = i n where i n−m = i m is cyclic.
Note that, except for i 0 and i n , the unmatched players at µ and µ are identical, hence by Lemma 4, except i, the solitary players at µ and µ are identical. Then µ has one less solitary player than µ. This contradicts the fact that µ is solitary-minimum. 
A.4 Main Result : The Seller-Market is the Union of all Solitary-Player Markets
For any solitary-minimum matching µ, let S µ be the set of all µ-reachable players from players in
is the union of all solitary-player markets at µ.
Theorem 5 Let µ be any solitary-minimum matching at u. The Seller-Market at u is the union of all solitary-player markets, i.e., (B * , S * ) = (B µ , S µ ).
Lemma 6 Let (B, S) be any bipartite submarket and µ be an active-minimum matching at u. Then there is (i) no unmatched player in S and (ii) no nonsolitary player in B.
Proof. Suppose there is an unmatched player in S. By definition of a submarket, there is a matching ν that matches S into B. The matching µ that agrees with ν for S-players and with µ for other players matches more active players than µ does. But then µ is not active-minimum.
Contradiction.
Suppose there is a nonsolitary player i ∈ B ∪ S. Then i ∈ B by (i) and there is a µ-cycle i 0 , i 1 , ..., i n ; j 1 , ..., j n from i 0 = i with j 1 ∈ S. But then, by alternation, there is an active-minimum matching that leaves j 1 unmatched. This contradicts (i). 
. We will show (B, S) = (B , S ).
By construction, no B -player has demand for any player in S − S (since S − S is "unreachable"
(otherwise S is not matchable into B.) Then B − B and S − S must be empty because (B, S) is unitary (otherwise S is not matchable into B − i for some i ∈ B − B .)
The Market Procedure we give in Section 6 is a Seller-Market tracing procedure. We use the following fact in proving its convergence.
Corollary 1
The excess in the Seller-Market at u is equal to the number of solitary players at any solitary-minimum matching at u.
We refer to a solitary-minimum matching with no solitary player as a solitary-null matching.
Corollary 2 An aspiration is balanced if and only if it admits a solitary-null matching.
The statement below gives a characterization for solitary-minimum matchings : The "only if"
part follows from the proof of Lemma 5 and the "if" part follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 3 An active-minimum matching µ is solitary-minimum if and only if all the µ-sequences from solitary players are cycle-free.
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37 Corollary 3 is the counterpart of the characterization for active-minimum matchings in Footnote 35 and would be used to find a solitary-minimum matching in any demand graph.
Remark 9 It also follows from Theorem 5 that the Seller-Market is the maximum-excess bipartite submarket with minimum size. In particular, maximum-excess bipartite submarkets are closed under intersection hence there is a unique minimum-size maximum-excess bipartite submarket, namely, the Seller-Market.
B Proofs for Sections 3 and 4
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the key result below. We say (N, f ) is piecewise linear if every f ij is piecewise linear.
Recall that a feasible direction at an aspiration u is a nonzero vector d ∈ R N such that u + λd is an aspiration for all sufficiently small λ > 0. Given a feasible direction d at u, if f ij are piecewise linear, the demand graph D(u + λd) is identical for all sufficiently small λ > 0 which we denote
Lemma 7 ( Direction Lemma) Let (N, f ) be piecewise linear. If (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at an aspiration u, then there is a feasible direction d with
such that (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at u + λd for all sufficiently small λ > 0.
Proof. Let f ij denote the right-hand derivative of f ij . Take any d ∈ R N such that
Clearly, d is a feasible direction at u. Let ν be any active-minimum matching in D + B (u, d). If ν matches every S-player, then (B, S) is a bipartite submarket at u + λd for all sufficiently small λ > 0. Therefore, suppose ν does not match every S-player. Let B be the set of all unmatched B-players and S be the set of all S-players which are ν-reachable from B -players in D
has a greater cardinality than S . By recursion, this will prove the lemma since S is a finite set.
Alter the direction d(δ) by increasing δ continuously above 0 up to δ * where a new pair ij joins
holds. Otherwise, S * has a greater cardinality than S since j ∈ S * − S and S ⊂ S * . In this case, claim (ii) holds. End of claim.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 : Suppose (N, f ) is piecewise linear. For any aspiration u and any seller-market (B, S) at u, let g S (u) be the sum of u i for i ∈ S, and let g(u) be the maximum of g S (u) over all seller-markets at u. Since the set of aspirations is nonempty and closed, there is an aspiration u * such that g(u * ) is maximum among all aspirations. Then u * has no seller-market, for otherwise by the Direction Lemma, there is an aspiration u with g(u ) > g(u * ) contradicting maximality of u * . So there exists a balanced aspiration for every piecewise linear (N, f ) and by uniform approximation for (N, f ).
Lemma 8 The demand set of every
Proof. If i demands j at u and u is an aspiration with u i < u i , then
Lemma 9 Let u be a balanced aspiration and u be any aspiration. Then N show that u is a stable allocation. Suppose not.
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching at u. Since u is nonrealizable, µ leaves an active player unmatched, say i. Note that i is nonsolitary at µ, because otherwise by Lemma 5 u has a sellermarket and is not balanced.
Let C be a µ-cycle from i which consists of a maximum number of players. Since there are an odd number of players in C, there must be two same-type players, say j, j , such that j is in C and j is not in C. We claim
If not, then u j < u j (otherwise no C-player demands j at u contradicting j ∈ C). Then no player other than j demands j at u. So D j (u) = {j} (otherwise D j (u) is empty but j is active at u). Hence j is unmatched at u. But then µ is augmentable contradicting the fact that µ is active-minimum. End of claim.
Therefore there is a C-player who demands j at u. Then j must be matched at u (otherwise µ is augmentable therefore not active-minimum). But then there is a µ-cycle from i (obtained by "adding" the pair (j , µ(j )) to C) which contains a greater number of players. Contradiction. Lemma 11 There is a stable bipartition at any υ in V.
Proof. Suppose there is no stable bipartition at some υ in V. Let υ be any payoff in V where .., i n } , J = {j 1 , ..., j n } be the player sets defined recursively by setting j k = µ(i k ) and i k+1 = µ (j k ). Then (i n+1 , j n+1 ) = (i 1 , j 1 ).
(ii ) By Lemma 11, let (Y 1 , Y 2 ) be a stable bipartition at some υ in V . By Lemma 3, (Y 1 , Y 2 ) is a stable bipartition at V . PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 : Consider any piecewise linear game. Let K be any finite collection of balanced aspirations. Let u be any balanced aspiration in U at which u i ∈ med(K) i for a maximum number of players. We claim u i ∈ med(K) i for every i. Suppose not. Then the sets B = {i ∈ N | u * * i < u i } and S = {i ∈ N | u i < u * i } cannot both be empty. Note that players in B and S are nonconstant players.
Define U = {u ∈ U |u * * i ≤ u i for i ∈ B, u i ≤ u * i for i ∈ S, and u i = u i for i / ∈ B ∪ S}. Clearly U is nonempty and closed. So there is a υ ∈ U such that i∈B υ i ≤ i∈B u i for every u ∈ U . If
i for some i ∈ B or υ i = u * i for some i ∈ S, then there would be an additional player i with υ i ∈ med(K) i . Contradiction. So B = {i ∈ N | u * * i < υ i } and S = {i ∈ N | u * i < υ i }. By Proposition 2, there is a matching at υ, say µ, that matches all the nonconstant players (among each other.) Let n = m when |K| is odd and n = m + 1 when |K| is even.
Let i be any player in S and j = µ(i). By Lemma 1, u j < υ j for every u ∈ U such that u i > υ i .
Since at least n elements of K give a higher payoff to i than υ, at least n elements of K give a lower payoff to j than υ. Hence j ∈ B. Thus S is matchable into B at υ.
Let i be any player in B and j ∈ D i (υ). By Lemma 8, u j > υ j for any u ∈ U such that u i < υ i .
Since at least n elements of K give a lower payoff to i than υ, at least n elements of K give a higher payoff to j than υ. Hence j ∈ S and the demand set of every B-player is in S at υ. 
Thus (B,
uu -players are active at u .
C.1 A Characterization of the Demand Bargaining Set
Let D be the Demand Bargaining Set at an aspiration u. Consider the set of active-unmatched players A(µ). We say that an aspiration-allocation u µ is maximal if there is no ij ∈ D(u) with i, j ∈ A(µ).
Proposition 7 An aspiration-allocation u µ is in D if and only if u µ is maximal and u has no balanced market (B, S) with B ⊂ A(µ).
Proof. (⇒) Let u µ be a maximal aspiration-allocation and suppose there is no balanced-market (B, S) at u such that B ⊂ N − µ(N ). Suppose to the contrary that there is a justified objection
Let (u , µ ) be an allocation for the restricted market (T, f ). Let B = {i ∈ T |u i < u i }. Then
Now let S be the union of the demand sets of B-players. Suppose S T. Then, there is a pair ij ∈ D(u) with i ∈ B and j ∈ S − T. So ((i, j), (u i , u j )) is a counterobjection to (T, u ).
Contradiction. Therefore, S ⊂ T. By maximality of u µ , S ∩ A(µ) = ∅. Hence S ⊂ T − B. So from the claim above |S| ≤ |B| .
Finally let ν be any active-minimum matching in D B (u). It is not possible that ν matches B into S for otherwise (B, S) would be a balanced-market at u with B ⊂ A(µ). Therefore, since |S| ≤ |B| as shown above, it must be that ν leaves a player i in B unmatched. Let (B i , S i ) be the ν i -market.
(⇐) Suppose u µ is not maximal. Then there is a pair ij ∈ D(u) with i, j ∈ A(µ). Then
Consider any piecewise linear game. Suppose there is a balanced-market (B, S) at u wth B ⊂ A(µ). By Lemma 7, let u = u + λd, where d is a feasible direction such that d i > 0 for all i ∈ S and d i < 0 for all i ∈ B. It is clear that (B ∪ S, u ) is a justified objection to u µ for sufficiently small
By uniform approximation, the same holds for any game. Theorem 3 says that pseudostable allocations are "stable" from an "exclusive" Bargaining Set perspective. It is on the other hand true that the Demand Bargaining Set may contain nonpseudostable allocations. We show in the examples below that these may in fact be various not fitting into a classification at hand. First, we show that the Demand Bargaining Set is a refinement of the Zhou Bargaining set :
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3, Inclusion Lemma and Examples
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an aspiration-allocation
there is an objection (T, u ) to u µ such that any counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u ) satisfies either
There can be no counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u ) with Q ⊂ T :
Consider now any counterobjection (Q, u) to (T, u ) with T ⊂ Q. Then u i > u i > u µ i for i ∈ T . Now let (u, µ ) be any allocation for the restricted game (Q, f ) and i be any player in
is a counterobjection to (T, u ), but then it is not true that T ⊂ {i, µ (i)} since there are at least two players in T . Contradiction.
Example 4 shows that D may contain some non-pseudostable maximum balanced-aspirationallocations but not all. Example 5 shows that D may contain maximum non-balanced -aspirationallocations. Example 5 also displays dominated allocations that are in Z and not in D. It is worth adding that the null-allocation is not in D but may be in Z, for instance, in any three-person game where there is no stable allocation.
Example 4 There are five players in N = {1,2,3,4,5}. The worth of a partnership is 2 for the pairs in {12,13,23,34,45}
and 0 otherwise. Let u = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and µ = {12,34} (see Figure 6a ). Clearly u µ is a maximum balanced-aspiration-allocation but µ is not solitary-null at u. Let T = {4,5} and u = (u 4 , u 5 ) =
(1 + , 1 − ) where 0 < < 1. It is easily checked that (T, u ) is a justified objection to u µ so u µ is not in Z and therefore not in D.
Now consider the extended game with four additional players {6,7,8,9} where the worth of a partnership is 2 for the pairs in {12, 13,23,34,45,56,67,78,79,89} and 0 otherwise. Let u = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and µ = µ∪{67,89} (see Figure 6b) . Clearly, again, u µ is a maximum balanced-aspiration-allocation but µ is not solitary-null at u. Using Proposition 7, it is easy to see that u µ is in D and therefore in Z. Example 5 There are two sets -I and J -of same-type players where |I| = n ≥ 3 and J consists of two players say j, j . The worth of a pair with one player from each set is 2 and with both players from I is 2 − 2 (where 0 < < 1.) The players j, j cannot form a pair with each other.
The demand is equal to {ij, ij |i ∈ I} for δ < (see Figure 7a ) and equal to {ij, ij |i ∈ I} ∪ {ii |i, i ∈ I} for δ = (see Figure 7b ). The payoff u where u i is equal to 1 − δ for i ∈ I and 1 + δ for j ∈ J is an aspiration for every δ ≤ . (It is a non-balanced aspiration for every δ < and a balanced aspiration for δ = .) Let µ be any matching that consists of two pairs ij and i j where i, i ∈ I and j, j ∈ J.
It is easily seen that u µ is in Z for any odd n for all δ ≤ . Note that u µ is dominated for n ≥ 5 : There are n − 2 unmatched I-players all but one of whom can form a pair with another unmatched I-player and achieve a payoff equal to 1 − strictly above her stand alone utility.
On the other hand, by Proposition 7, u µ is not in D for n > 3 for any δ ≤ . To see this, let I 0 = {i, i } ⊂ I be any two unmatched players. In case δ < , (I , J) is a balanced-market with I 0 ⊂ N − µ(N ), and in case δ = , u µ is not maximal, so in both cases u µ is not in D by Proposition 7.
It is easily checked that u µ is in D for n = 3 for any δ ≤ . 
Solitary-Minimal Matching Routine
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching in (D, A).
Step 1 : If µ is not active-minimum in (D , A ) then augment/alter µ to an activeminimum matching µ 1 . Otherwise, let µ 1 = µ.
Step 2 : If µ 1 is not solitary-minimum in (D , A ) then alter µ 1 to a solitary-minimum matching µ 2 . Otherwise, let µ 2 = µ 1 .
Then let µ = µ 2 .
The Routine above finds a solitary-minimum matching µ in (D , A ). It is an elementary recursion 38 and we omit the straightforward proof. It remains to identify Z(µ ).
Lemma 13 player and the reachability sequence can be selected judiciously.
Step 1 thus can be carried out in a simple way. In particular, µ 1 differs from µ by at most a single pair. Similar comments go for Step 2 and µ 2 differs from µ 1 by at most a single pair.
and i ∈ B, j ∈ S, it is clear that ν also matches S into B in D. In the remaining case, let ν be a matching that matches S into B − i in D , then ν is in D.
It is worth pointing out that the result above holds neither for successive unitary markets nor for successive seller-markets. We use it in proving our key lemma below which says that successive solitary-player sets Z(µ ), Z(µ) are nested when µ is selected by SMMR.
Let Z 0 be the set of all players in Z(µ) who are in A and not matched by µ .
Lemma 14 Z(µ ) ⊂ Z 0 ⊂ Z(µ).
Proof. A player i ∈ Z(µ ) is in A and therefore in A. Also, i is not matched by the matching µ 1 that is constructed in SMMR (for otherwise i would not be in Z(µ )). Therefore i is not matched by µ (otherwise i would not be in A ). By Theorem 5, then, i belongs to a unitary market in (D , A ), and therefore by Lemma 13, to a seller-market in (D, A). Therefore i ∈ Z(µ) by Lemma 6(ii).
Solitary-Player Set Routine
Let µ be a solitary-minimum matching and Z(µ) the solitary-player set in (D, A). 
